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A CULTURAL HISTORIAN'S READING OF CHARLES
REICH'S IMPACT ON THE CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE
ON "WELFARE"
BRIGITTE FLEISCHMANN*

I.

CHARLES REICH AND THE "NEW PROPERTY"

Twenty-five years after publication of The New Property in the
Yale Law Journal1 the situation of welfare recipients and other
groups expected to benefit from an enlarged conception of entitlement has not improved so noticeably as to render Charles Reich's
earlier criticism and program a memorable, though no longer factrelated, instance of social engagement. Reich's concerns about the
state of American society and societal injustices appear essentially
unchanged since he first expressed them in 1964; equally unchanged is his strong belief in the virtue of the legal device "new
property."
Reich's discussions of "welfare," including those contained in his
pathbreaking book The Greening of America2 and his most recent
statements at the Sixth Annual Institute of Bill of Rights Law
Symposium at the College of William and Mary,' can be understood as commentaries on American society and culture, as contributions to political philosophy and as programs of legal intent.
This is why they have attracted the attention of a heterogeneous
audience and have challenged the "interpreters" of both culture
and law. Although Reich's book and articles are replete with sociocultural descriptions, evaluations and considerations, these references are clearly part of a jurist's attempt to lay the groundwork
for a legal solution. Reich's works embody cultural criticism in the
service of the law.
* Visiting Professor and Senior Fellow, 1988-89, Commonwealth Center, College of William and Mary. Dr. phil., 1978, Dr. phil. habil., 1988, Privatdozentin, 1989, University of
Munich, West Germany.
1. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
2. C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970).
3. Reich, The Liberty Impact of the New Property, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 295 (1990).
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A "literary" configuration such as the one characterizing Reich's
works carries a message beyond the obvious and calls for a special
approach. The reader is tempted to ask questions other than those
customarily advanced in textual interpretation. Several questions
come to mind almost automatically: What are the source and the
significance of the interlinking yet different strands of reasoning in
these texts? And, how and to what extent do extralegal considerations partake in the process of problem solving? As Duncan Kennedy demonstrated in another context, the interlinking of different
rhetorical or argumentative modes reflects one contemporary trend
in legal thinking and is indicative of a modern dilemma: "The opposed rhetorical modes lawyers use reflect a deeper level of contradiction. At this deeper level, we are divided, among ourselves and
also within ourselves, between irreconcilable visions of humanity
and society, and between radically different aspirations for our
4
common future."
As an expression of a new consciousness, or at least as a preferred innovative way of dealing with legal problems and of addressing an audience outside the juristic community at the same
time, the interconnection of traditionally unrelated argumentative
modes has become part of the legacy of Charles Reich's writings.
This interconnection is an outstanding characteristic of not only
today's treatises on "entitlement," but even those treatises conceived of as counterstatements to Reich's program.
In the following commentary, I will limit my discussion *totwo
examples, each representing a model of combining legal and extralegal thought. One example, though essentially in accordance with
Reich's plea for a legal solution to the welfare problem, is actually
a program that goes far beyond a mere uncovering of systemic
weaknesses and a subsequent redefinition of legal concepts; it envisages a total reorganization of social and legal structures. The
other example is highly critical of social and legal experiments, and
is wary of the dangers that might arise from the "constitutionalization" of an issue traditionally regarded as a matter of moral rather
than of legal concern. Although most of the quotations are taken

4. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1685 (1976).
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from two publications by Roberto Mangabeira Unger5 and from
one publication by Carl E. Schneider, 6 this paper's actual range of
sources is wider, and includes ideas derived from discussions with
colleagues and friends, and from lecture and seminar notes.
As a reminder, and in order to avoid future cross-references, I
will begin by itemizing those features of Charles Reich's plan for a
more just future that reemerge continually in the contemporary
discourse on entitlement. First is Reich's general statement that
"[s]ociety today is built around entitlement ... [and] that [i]t is
only the poor whose entitlements, although recognized by public
policy, have not been effectively enforced."' The lack of effective
enforcement is related to the fact that society views welfare benefits more or less as donations from the state. This attitude implies
that "in dispensing public 'charity'... government need only be as
fair as the conscience or discretion of the majority dictates."'
Society's willingness to support the needy and the conditions of
eligibility it imposes are not constant, but tend to change, and
often in response to political moods and popular notions. The potential for inconsistency and arbitrariness is enhanced further by
the insufficiently circumscribed power and wide range of discretion
administrative agencies possess in dealing with dependent persons.
Shifting the focus from the donor to the recipient, we learn that
a beneficiary is exposed not only to sometimes questionable interpretations of the laws and rules applied to welfare, but also to censorious measures justified by his or her allegedly reproachable
lifestyle. "Denial, reduction and termination of welfare benefits on
vague, unarticulated or clearly illegal grounds is apparently wide-

5. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SociAL THEORY (1976)
[hereinafter R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SociETY]; Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983) [hereinafter Unger, CriticalLegal Studies].
6. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy" Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalizationof Social Issues, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1988, at
79.
7. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245, 1255 (1965).
8. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law:
The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 65, 94 (1982).
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spread; methods used to check continuing eligibility have also been
attacked as legally questionable if not unconstitutional."'
As an object of public charity, the beneficiary is expected to conform to rules that are frequently derived from a community's
model of ideals rather than from the actual pattern of behavior
tolerated in "nondependent" citizens. As Reich and other authorities on the subject suggest, an indigent person will most likely become exposed to decisions that bear the imprint of a world view at
odds with reality. Infringements of an indigent person's rights, so
we learn, are "common occurrences"; an evaluation of a beneficiary's behavior and attitudes may tip the scales in favor of or
against his or her continued enjoyment of government largess.'0
Although Reich leaves no doubt that the violations of rights and
privacy that beneficiaries must tolerate in return for governmental
support would cause malaise to the altruist, the specific constellation of modern life is what makes the demand for a remedy more
urgent. In a world characterized by the decline of interpersonal relations, the traditional donor-recipient pattern is inadequate, as
are the inherited axioms concerning obligation, stewardship, gratitude, work and success. Modern society is not yet able to cope with
the exigencies or side effects of technology and science. Unwilling
or unable to reassess the reliability of their hypotheses, contemporary welfare agents have failed to see that nonpersonal factors may
be responsible for the poor's predicament. They have also failed to
acknowledge that "the poor are affirmative contributors to today's
society, for we are so organized as virtually to compel this sacrifice
by a segment of the population.""
Seen from this perspective, politicians and administrators should
no longer be burdened with a task they are not prepared to fulfill.
Clearly, the law, as the guarantor of an unbiased transfer of benefits, must assume a reformist role. Insistence on a legal solution has
its source in the assumption that culture has failed to come to
terms with technological and scientific developments, and that automatic regulation is an illusory hope. Demand for a legal solution
9. J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD &

S. MESSINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE POOR: ISSUES FOR SOCIO-

4 (1967) [hereinafter J. CARLIN].
10. "One of the most significant regulatory by-products of government largess is power
over the recipients' 'moral character.'" Reich, supra note 1, at 747.
11. Reich, supra note 7, at 1255.
LOGICAL RESEARCH
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also has its source in the moral qualms of the altruist, and in the
recognition that there are untapped resources in the realm of the
law.
In Charles Reich's discourse, the findings of the cultural observer and the convictions of the moral philosopher converge into a
request to extend the concept of property rights to welfare benefits. As soon as this request takes shape, a line will be drawn that
extralegal considerations cannot overstep; entitlement will become
the exclusive responsibility of the jurist.12
II.

BEYOND THE

"NEW

PROPERTY"

In Charles Reich's reflections on "entitlement," the fusion of different argumentative modes ends when ultimate responsibility is
delegated to the jurist; at that point a dividing line between competences, and in the same manner between rhetorical modes, is established. This dividing line, however, is erased under a cognate,
though far more radical, critical legal studies conception by Roberto M. Unger."
Entitlement, as it appears in Unger's discussion of what the law
ought to be, is part of a broad vision aimed at radical change, that
is, at recurrent acts of "deconstruction" and subsequent "reconstruction" of society, the economy and the law. 4 It is a vision that
refuses to be restrained by givens, whether they are cultural, constitutional, or part of a time-sanctioned juristic creed. Here, the
merging of legal and extralegal reasoning is even more emphatic
and far-reaching than in Reich's version because it is part and parcel of a strategy destined to dismantle rigid conventions, to disrupt
policies created by an allegedly binding world view, and to break
up the boundaries that have traditionally separated the world of
legal thought and diction from the outside world. The mood of this
vision is conveyed by Unger's statement that "[1]egal analysis can

12. "[W]hile the policy of entitlement is one developed by philosophers of welfare, effectuating it (particularly when the ideal must be approached pragmatically) is within the professional competence of lawyers alone." Id. at 1256.
13. See generally Unger, CriticalLegal Studies, supra note 5.

14. Id.
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now be made to stand in unashamed communion with its underlying theoretical assumptions.' 5
Because the idea of entitlement can only be realized within a
changed and changing framework of society and law according to
this perspective, the lines of reasoning leading to a plea for entitlement form an intricate network from which extralegal considerations are never released. The only mode of argumentation that can
be considered adequate is one that attempts "to cross both an empirical and a normative frontier: the boundaries that separate doctrine from empirical social theory and . .. from ideological conflict."'1 6 The essential elements of Unger's method are a thorough

knowledge of the existing and developing body of the law, and the
willingness and ability of the intellectual to contribute to cultural
improvement.
Unger's so-called "expanded doctrine"'17 is inspired by modern
social theory and, above all, by the deconstructionist teachings of
the "postmodernists" in the humanities. Thus prompted and justified, the new juristic doctrinaire makes use of historiography and
critical portrayals of the present to lay open the deficiencies of
communal life and to furnish proof that one can look to the problem of equality and, more specifically, to the problem of welfare
from other than well-established directions. The new doctrine also
uses criticism of the past and present to expose other ways to
transform ideas or reform projects into operational or institutional
devices, or both, that many persons involved in the welfare issue
are unable or unwilling to acknowledge.
Modern society is pictured as carrying the stigma of the failure
of traditional ideas and as being "increasingly ... forced open to

transformative conflict."' 8 The verdict on contemporary society is
severe. Social relations are identified as lacking contour and
breadth; the models that inform societal relations are seen as
vague and limited in scope; the existing pattern of rights, we learn,
is ill-defined, and needs a new categorization. Narrowing the field
of concepts used to circumscribe basic rights, as conceived of in
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 612.
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id. at 579.
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this program, to one closer to "welfare," Unger asserts that today's
connotations of one of the most relevant terms in this context,
"obligation," exemplify the reductionist trend of our times. "For
another thing, the still-ruling account of the sources of obligations
sees obligations to arise primarily from either perfected acts of will
(e.g., the fully formalized, bilateral executory contract) or the unilateral imposition of a duty by the state."'"
One of the conclusions drawn from a detailed and highly critical
analysis of modern life is that "the received ideas about the nature
of rights and the sources of obligation cannot readily inform even
the existing sorts of communal existence, much less the ones to
which we aspire. ' ' 0 As one may expect from such an evaluation of
the past and present, the program for a better future calls for a
radical redefinition of means and goals. This redefinition is labeled
"superliberal" and is expected to transcend the "liberal premises
about state and society, about freedom from dependence and governance of social relations by the will."'" The concomitant reconstruction of the system of rights is described as a task to be engineered by "purposive"2 2 legal reasoning, a form of reasoning that
can transform knowledge about routine and dissent, about ideals
and betrayed ideals, into a reformist scheme.23
Because the welfare problem is only one symptom of a widespread societal disease, the plea for welfare entitlement, in its most
complete visionary form, will not rely simply on thoughts about
poverty and its concomitants; it will be the offspring of a process in
the course of which legal thinking will be freed from the shackles
of the past, and will partake of continuously redefined and improved norms. The idea of entitlement as "new property" will give
way to the dialectical mood of this program; it will succumb to the
conviction that the era of the "classical" conception of property as
"the very model of right"2 4 belongs to the past and its still lingering spirit must be defeated.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 597.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 602.
Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1728.
See UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIry, supra note 5, at 199-200 and passim.
Unger, CriticalLegal Studies, supra note 5, at 598.
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The conviction that legal discourse should no longer be shaped
by juristic language and logic alone, but should pay tribute to epistemologies outside the legal realm, is, without doubt, ideological in
origin. As of today, however, the fusion of argumentative modes is
no longer reserved to the group in which it originated, and it has
ceased to establish a common bond among those who acknowledge
the virtues and advantages of a discourse unrestrained by the rigid
rules of juristic doctrine and diction. How the interconnection of
argumentative modes is used and for what reasons are matters of
consciousness, of world view and of the respective author's assumptions about the relative strengths of culture and willed
change.
From the point of view of the legal visionary, the cores of cultural (social, political, economic) persistence are destined to submit sooner or later to better insight. "[T]he institutional setup, the
gradualistic bias of doctrine, and the correlation of forces in contemporary politics and culture all impose constraints upon the recasting of equal protection law . . . .These constraints, however,
neither involve high-flown principles nor generate clear-cut
boundaries."2
III.

DEFENDING THE CURRENT CONCEPTION OF WELFARE

An opposing view, which I will call conservative for heuristic
purposes only, emphasizes that some of the "constraints" to which
Unger refers in the above quotation may be informed by vectors
that are more powerful, and probably more compatible with and
beneficial for society than scholastic principles or conscious efforts
at reform; in other words, they may be informed by cultural
standards.
Standards, then, are the means by which society strikes a balance between reality and tradition. They determine not only the
conduct and conditions conceived to be intolerable: they also
dictate the terms in which the problem is cast, the nature of the
solutions sought and, hence, the forms of pressure demanded of
its several social institutions.2 6
25. Id. at 615.
26. Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transitionfrom Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J. 286, 286 (1962).
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The strong belief in standards as essential and form-giving elements of the communal order leads to the request that social programming respect the conventions and convictions prevalent in a
given society. Therefore, the "imagined" and "made" 7 legal solutions Unger envisages are rejected, and so is the plea for a constitutionalization of social problems, for "society's needs . . . are
much more fluid, complex, and opaque than constitutional
thought."2
As of today, the conservative perspective does not appear to differ widely from earlier kindred versions. Yet its proponents have
become disquieted enough by the "postmodern" stance taken by
their colleagues in the juristic community to follow the lead and
base their argumentation on a broader foundation of social and
cultural considerations. Along with legal arguments advising
against the inclusion of welfare into a manual of entitlements, today's conservatives advance a series of extralegal reasons that is
destined to defend and uphold the present theory and practice of
welfare arrangements.
Like the supporters of the entitlement theory, the conservatives
start from the presupposition that one can no longer pretend that
American life is shaped by a single set of values and one model of
morality. The conservative philosophy does suppose, however, that
common moral denominators exist in social units of less than national size, and that "morality can also derive and acquire its unity
from a pattern of moral injunctions recognized in the experience,
'
ideals, and practices of a group." 29
One may expect every such pattern to contain several specific
injunctions that relate to or define the theme "welfare"; in other
words, one may start from the presupposition that a society or
group's "canon" of prescriptions and proscriptions will contain
normative correspondents of the cultural ideas about human nature, 30 mutualism and obligation, as well as about poverty and its
proper therapy. According to the disciples of traditionalism, the
treasure of cultural standards or norms, if properly handled by

27.
28.
29.
30.

Unger, CriticalLegal Studies, supra note 5, at 579.
Schneider, supra note 6, at 122.
Id. at 99 (construing S. HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT 82-100 (1983)).
See id. at 101-06.
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lawmakers, could be the source and testing ground for an effective
legal apparatus. Standards are qualified to inform social policy
when they can be proven to meet at least these three criteria: historical depth, scientific relevance and functional value in communal life." As Carl E. Schneider and others have pointed out, various examples demonstrate that courts have honored this
methodological device by conceding that a "statute is adequately
founded in empirical reality and social theory." 2
In both the visionary and conservative conceptions, history and
social theory are treated as valuable sources of information and
justification. In contrast to the visionary, however, the conservative
tends to act upon the message of continuity and persistence, and
to ignore the instances of "revolutionary re-creation,

' 33

a term Un-

ger uses.
Wary of what Germans call the "watering-can principle," the
nondiscriminating distribution of benefits among those claiming to
be in need, the defender of the traditional concept may call attention to the "expectation of reciprocity" 34 as an anthropological universal, or to the need for control as a pancultural phenomenon. His
resistance to the idea of a "new property" is reinforced by the general disagreement among social scientists as to the sources of poverty and the nature of desirable relations between donors and recipients. The "'Flawed-Character' argument" and the "'Restricted
Opportunity' argument" continue to co-exist,3 5 and whether poverty should be treated in "moral" or "amoral" terms 3 6 is still unde-

cided. The lack of consensus in historical and sociological interpretations serves, without doubt, as an additional incentive or
authorization to continue a program of "individualized justice" 37
and to defend the corresponding measures in terms of the "public
interest."

31.
32.
33.
34.

See id.
Id. at 102.
Unger, CriticalLegal Studies, supra note 5, at 583.
Gregory, Image of Limited Good, or Expectation of Reciprocity?, 16 CURRENT AN-

THROPOLOGY

73 (1975).

35. B. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY
36. Woodard, supra note 26, at 293.
37. J. CARLIN, supra note 9, at 25.

AND DISCRIMINATION

39-40 (2d ed. 1976).
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According to this school of thought, regulation is a concomitant
of a society's sense of order, and it is considered basically nondetrimental. Because the rules of regulation are culturally created, one
can expect the mode of regulation to be tailored to the interests of
all the parties involved.
In an additional effort, destined to give weight to the conservative argument, one may defend the status quo of welfare regulation
as a byproduct of public charity in personalistic or community-oriented terms. Thus, one could see beneficiaries who comply with
the rules and mores of society as furnishing proof of their basic
integrity on the one hand, and of their affirmative attitudes toward
the social compact on the other hand; their behavior, one might
say, may be a further incentive to altruism. Because communal
concerns should take precedence over individual interests, infringements of privacy may be justifiable when they occur in the
service of the public good or for integrative purposes, or when they
are conceived in such a way as to "inhibit the growth of what
might be called an offensive social environment."3
One of the central messages of this theory of welfare is that the
deficiencies of the present welfare system do not call for radical
solutions. Closing gaps, subjecting agencies to closer scrutiny and
allowing welfare to progress at the pace set by cultural development will suffice.
In this mode of argumentation, as opposed to the programmatic
writings I dealt with earlier in this paper, thoughts on culture, society and morality are not usually "enmeshed" with the juristic dis.course, but are rather an epilogue to conclusions that have been
arrived at already by legal reasoning. As a concession to the lay
reader on the most obvious level, this "epilogue" is also used to
reinforce the writer's legal convictions and to refute opposing views
by using the opponents' own technique of different rhetorical
modes.
Thus, to discredit "entitlement," one may invoke the social scientist's knowledge about a "culture of poverty,"3 9 or one may ques-

38. Schneider, supra note 6, at 100. For the controversy surrounding these justifications,
see id.
39. 0. LEwis, LA VIDA. A PUERTO RICAN FAMILY IN THE CULTURE OF POVERTY-SAN JUAN
AND NEW YORK xlii-lii (1966).
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tion the advisability of rethinking the welfare problem in Reich's
or Unger's terms, on the grounds that entitlement presupposes the
poor person "will have a sense of himself as a possessor of rights
• . . [or] will be concerned with holding authoritiesaccountable to
law . . . [or will] 'know [] his rights' and how to validate them."4
The range of rationales advanced extends from psychological
reasons to arguments informed by a pluralistic philosophy. One
can conclude from the examples given and the statements made in
Schneider's article 41 that the units or "communities" most likely to
shape and supervise the right kind of welfare program are the
states. "Individual states" are more apt to calibrate conflicting interests because they "are more susceptible than whole regions to
'42
the influence of cultural traditions.
Highly skeptical of the hopes attached to a principally legal solution to the problem, conservatives warn against the law taking over
a domain in which "legislatures speak with more authority than
courts,' 43 and in which a "judicial solution" would bar people from
the feeling that they have "control over their environments and
44
their lives.
Repeated references to the power and relevance of plural cul45
tural traditions betray the conservatives' deep suspicion of reason
as the best guide to social policy, and indicates a distrust of the
lawyer-philosopher, who claims he is able to solve the problem at
hand by virtue of his intellectual independence. Moreover, conservatives express severe doubts that the persons in need of support will actually benefit from a change in responsible authorities
and personnel.
This broad cultural and political conflict is intensified, I believe, by an attitude that has always been present, but which we
may have allowed ourselves to forget. It is the feeling that reason is the best guide to policy ...and that the educated are...
better equipped and better entitled to govern. This feeling finds
its institutional expression in a preference for extending the au-

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

J. CARLIN, supra note 9, at 62-63.

Schneider, supra note 6, at 108.
Id.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 117.
Id.
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thority of courts, the branch of government to which the elite
has the easiest and in many ways the most exclusive access.46
For the sake of "poetic justice," I will not conclude this paper
without recalling attention to an alternative attitude toward culture, the role of the lawyer and the law of the future. Again I refer
to Roberto M. Unger, who is convinced that tradition can no
longer be regarded as a wholesome force in social life, and who asserts that "the formative order of social life has been subject to
continuing conflict and cumulative insight and thereby deprived of
some of its halo of naturalness and necessity. 47 Regarding the enhanced role of the legal thinker in the new scheme, Unger does not
hesitate to proclaim that the ideal jurist may indeed claim an intellectually autonomous status, and that his independence is warranted by his attitude or belief that he has "no stake in finding a
preestablished harmony between moral compulsions and institutional constraints."4 And finally, playing upon the theme of
growth versus willed change, Unger professes his faith in a
predominantly rationally constructed future:
But postliberal, traditionalistic, and revolutionary socialist society are all obsessed, in different ways, with the reconciliation of
freedom and community. This alliance is part of a broader responsibility; the sense of a latent or natural order in social life
must be harmonized with the capacity to let the will remake social arrangements. To achieve this reconciliation, and thereby to
work toward the ideal of a universal community, is the great political task of modern societies. But it is also the precondition to
our ability, as theorists, to bridge the gap between subjectivity
and objectivity in social understanding and to perfect our vision
of social order.49
IV.

CONCLUSION

From the perspective of the cultural historian and of the foreigner, contemporary discourse on the welfare issue provides tell-

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 109.
Unger, CriticalLegal Studies, supra note 5, at 582.
Id. at 581.
R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SociETY, supra note 5, at 266.
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ing examples of the relevance and function of dissenting opinions
about society and law. No single opinion can be expected to be
fully actualized, yet each is an active component in a process of
orchestration that is destined to uphold the principles of an American-style dynamic federalism.
Without doubt, many a jurist will disagree with the selected arguments that I believe are pivotal in the discourse on welfare. I
would like to remind those who do disagree, however, that the defenders of a new legal history envisage an interlinking of the diverse approaches to legal text and context, a method which, in its
turn, repeats the interlinking of the different argumentative modes
I have tried to describe. Cultural history is, or should be, a legitimate partner in the interpretation of legal discourse.

